Here's a feedback on the
above article and its forecasts from a hobby (as I understand)
military reporter Rostislav Marsov, whom I've never heard about before, but who was quoted by a very influential (in top 10 probably) Russian Telegram blogger
Igor Dimitriev, who is well-known for his sarcasm, criticism of many aspects of Russian governance (quite justified) and expertise (he's an orientalist as far as I know). I already posted translations of some of his posts
before.
So here's what this military correspondent writes, comparing the analysis and forecasts of the article of 'Russia in Global Affairs' and his own experience and observations during the SMO:
"What's next for us?
I came across an excellent analytical article on the SMO, which coincides with everything I have seen and heard here on the ground.
Here are a few theses:
- None of the parties has the experience of conducting such large-scale conflicts, where the forces and weapons of the warring parties are comparable. All military doctrines, tactics, technical developments and training were focused on the war of regular armies against partisans or armies of backward countries (Afghan, Syria, Iraq, Chechnya, Donbass 2014).
- Everyone is unprepared for war. The initial bet on a special police operation on our part and an economic blockade on the part of the West did not work. Hence the complaints against the command of both armies.
- Russia is fighting in the absence of numerical superiority with the minimum army in its history. Nevertheless, the initiative is on our side and we are winning, but it is not possible for us to win the war quickly for a number of reasons. A secret magic wand like mobilization or strikes on bridges on the Dnieper will not save. Winning quickly is simply physically impossible.
-
The conflict will not end with the complete victory of either side. By the end of 2022 or by the spring of 2023, there will be a truce that will define new borders between Russia and Ukraine. Then there will be a cold war in Europe
and in the future a new larger war.
My assumptions
The real winner will be the side that will
most effectively use the time for a truce and quickly rebuild its society and army for the Third World War, where the collective West, represented by NATO, will clash with an alliance of outsider countries of a civilized society (China, Iran, North Korea, Russia, Syria) with the tacit support of developing countries of the third world like India and the Arab countries.
Russia will most likely face a new totalitarianism alike Germany or the USSR of the 20-30s. Interbellum can bring a renewed fascism that will be born in the minds of veterans of an unpopular and dirty war, as it was after the First World War in Europe.
Ukraine could have the same thing, but most likely this country will plunge into Makhnovshchina (Nestor Makhno-style anarchy) and the final death of state institutions. Along with this, there will be a humanitarian crisis, up to and including famine, the flourishing of banditry due to the former Makhno (= anarchy -
ZradaXXII) units from the territorial defense, as well as hopeless economic fuck-up and total impoverishment.
Russia is directly interested in Ukraine becoming a European Afghanistan, sucking resources from the West like a cancerous tumor.
There will be no political movements and rallies in Russia. Having settled down a little, the power bloc of the Russian Federation will begin the process of militarization of society: building up army reserves and reorienting the economy to a centralized rail. Anyone who goes against the party line will be swept away by the state Leviathan.
On the whole, I have no emotional evaluation of the future in the sense of whether it's good or bad. We are just waiting for a funny and scary clusterfuck in the spirit of those books of the first half of the 20th century that we read with such interest.
The world of wealth growth is over, the era of wars, total submission and ultra-violence begins.
The postmodern is dead, long live the new wonderful world of the future!"
