https://t.me/rybar/80586 "Logistics Challenges 📝
Deeper Than They Seem
In Russia's southern regions, the situation is becoming increasingly ominous. Since the beginning of May, Ukrainian formations have significantly ramped up drone strikes against vehicles transporting various cargo to the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions, as well as Crimea. On the peninsula, a threat of shortages for certain goods has emerged, and fuel is now being sold under restrictions.
The threat extends beyond merely disrupting the tourist season in Crimea or causing shortages of specific products on the peninsula. Strikes against cargo carriers on the peninsula directly impact the combat capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces on the southern fronts—where the situation is already far from rosy.
🔻 What is happening on the front lines?
➡️ In the vicinity of Kamenske, the enemy has been on the offensive for some time and has managed to advance in several sectors, pushing back Russian troops: Stepnohirsk and Plavni have been all but lost, as have practically all territorial gains achieved by the Russian Armed Forces during the offensive launched in early 2025.
➡️ There is a risk that the enemy will not only restore the *status quo* but will also launch an offensive of their own along the Kamenske–Shcherbaky line. Indirect indicators suggest that the issues in this sector have been acknowledged; however, the situation remains difficult.
➡️ The activity of Ukrainian drone operators targeting Kamianka-Dniprovska, Vodiane, and Enerhodar has increased significantly. Every 20–30 minutes, local social media channels report drone attacks on the city—strikes that now number in the dozens. There have been fatalities and injuries among the local population. Employees of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant have also become targets, a fact officially confirmed by the facility's own information channels.
➡️ This may indicate that the enemy is preparing—if not a full-scale amphibious landing—then at least a diversionary strike across the reed beds covering the bed of the former Kakhovka Reservoir. The loss of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant cannot be permitted; dislodging even small groups of the enemy from that site would be an extremely difficult task. Moreover, the Russian Armed Forces would be severely constrained in their choice of strike assets, as the ZNPP is not the kind of facility that should be subjected to airstrikes.
❗️Given that Ukrainian formations have already partially paralyzed logistics in southern Russia—specifically within the land corridor leading to Crimea—it is not difficult to predict what would happen if the AFU were able to breach the Russian defenses along the Kamenskoye–Shcherbaki line.
📌The Russian Armed Forces would be forced to redeploy reinforcements along the route toward the general area of Vasylivka—roads to which are already under frequent enemy attack. In a worst-case scenario, stabilizing the situation would require moving additional forces along highways passing through the vicinity of Tokmak, as well as the more distant cities of Berdyansk and Mariupol. Yet, even now, the delivery of civilian cargo along these very routes is already severely disrupted.
❓So, what is to be done about this? The issue of organizing "low-altitude" air defense is well-understood (https://t.me/rybar/80578) and has been thoroughly analyzed. It has also been raised at the very highest levels (https://t.me/rybar/80549). The avalanche-like surge in attacks following the May holidays is visible to the naked eye—though the roads were hardly safe even before that period. It was right around the beginning of May that the AFU began field-testing their Hornet drones; subsequently—following a brief lull—they commenced their massive-scale deployment, offering no respite for the development of effective countermeasures.
Deeper Than They Seem
In Russia's southern regions, the situation is becoming increasingly ominous. Since the beginning of May, Ukrainian formations have significantly ramped up drone strikes against vehicles transporting various cargo to the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia regions, as well as Crimea. On the peninsula, a threat of shortages for certain goods has emerged, and fuel is now being sold under restrictions.
The threat extends beyond merely disrupting the tourist season in Crimea or causing shortages of specific products on the peninsula. Strikes against cargo carriers on the peninsula directly impact the combat capabilities of the Russian Armed Forces on the southern fronts—where the situation is already far from rosy.
🔻 What is happening on the front lines?
➡️ In the vicinity of Kamenske, the enemy has been on the offensive for some time and has managed to advance in several sectors, pushing back Russian troops: Stepnohirsk and Plavni have been all but lost, as have practically all territorial gains achieved by the Russian Armed Forces during the offensive launched in early 2025.
➡️ There is a risk that the enemy will not only restore the *status quo* but will also launch an offensive of their own along the Kamenske–Shcherbaky line. Indirect indicators suggest that the issues in this sector have been acknowledged; however, the situation remains difficult.
➡️ The activity of Ukrainian drone operators targeting Kamianka-Dniprovska, Vodiane, and Enerhodar has increased significantly. Every 20–30 minutes, local social media channels report drone attacks on the city—strikes that now number in the dozens. There have been fatalities and injuries among the local population. Employees of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant have also become targets, a fact officially confirmed by the facility's own information channels.
➡️ This may indicate that the enemy is preparing—if not a full-scale amphibious landing—then at least a diversionary strike across the reed beds covering the bed of the former Kakhovka Reservoir. The loss of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant cannot be permitted; dislodging even small groups of the enemy from that site would be an extremely difficult task. Moreover, the Russian Armed Forces would be severely constrained in their choice of strike assets, as the ZNPP is not the kind of facility that should be subjected to airstrikes.
❗️Given that Ukrainian formations have already partially paralyzed logistics in southern Russia—specifically within the land corridor leading to Crimea—it is not difficult to predict what would happen if the AFU were able to breach the Russian defenses along the Kamenskoye–Shcherbaki line.
📌The Russian Armed Forces would be forced to redeploy reinforcements along the route toward the general area of Vasylivka—roads to which are already under frequent enemy attack. In a worst-case scenario, stabilizing the situation would require moving additional forces along highways passing through the vicinity of Tokmak, as well as the more distant cities of Berdyansk and Mariupol. Yet, even now, the delivery of civilian cargo along these very routes is already severely disrupted.
❓So, what is to be done about this? The issue of organizing "low-altitude" air defense is well-understood (https://t.me/rybar/80578) and has been thoroughly analyzed. It has also been raised at the very highest levels (https://t.me/rybar/80549). The avalanche-like surge in attacks following the May holidays is visible to the naked eye—though the roads were hardly safe even before that period. It was right around the beginning of May that the AFU began field-testing their Hornet drones; subsequently—following a brief lull—they commenced their massive-scale deployment, offering no respite for the development of effective countermeasures.